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A Spiritually Enlightening Book

An eyewitness account of Vlasov's war

Excellent but interupted.Jimmy


Allies

Why America's largest class should be the wealthist.

A gripping read!On the one hand, I held "Portnoy's Complaint." Critically acclaimed, but likely to be puerile in view of my hoi polloi tastes. (A subsequent trip to the library proved me correct on this point!)
On the other hand, I held this little-known gem, "The American labor movement : hearing before the Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, on examining a fundamental change in society that... progress and opportunity in our nation--the decline of labor union membership, December 9, 1992." I took a cursory glance through the pages, and I was hooked INSTANTLY. Think Oliver Twist, late 20th century. Yes its that good!
I made the choice and I have never looked back. Are you as bold as I? Can you do it? PLEASE read "The American labor movement : hearing before the Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, on examining a fundamental change in society that... progress and opportunity in our nation--the decline of labor union membership, December 9, 1992," you won't regret it!


A nice overviewRoss' work opens with perhaps one of the great ironies of the Cold War: by 1946 the U.S. military, arguably the most powerful armed force in history at the end of WWII, and certainly the most well rounded, had been gutted to the point that it was not only incapable of defending Western Europe, it was largely incapable of even slowing the U.S.S.R. down. At the same time, there is the puzzling dichotomy of a military forced to rely on atomic weapons to compensate for a lack of conventional forces, at the same time that they have no idea how many weapons are available, and only a dim view of their battlefield utility. Thus, the first plans Ross discusses, are defined by a complete withdrawal from Western Europe, and a WWIII fought from the Middle East. The initial phases of such a conflict would entail an evacuation of continental Western Europe, a reinforcement of Great Britain, and securing the Mediterranean theater of operations. At the same time, atomic attacks would attempt to pound the U.S.S.R. and its satellites into submission. In the final phases of this scenario, the Allies would drive into the Soviet Union from the south, through the Caucuses. This final element is interesting in that it draws far more on the maneuver theory so prevalent today, than do the latter iterations of the plan, which presage the defense in depth of later decades.
It would excessive to give an overview of each additional scenario, but there are a few developments in the following years that often define the remainder of the Cold War era. The first is that the arms race is defined at a very early date; aside from the use of atomic weapons, Ross repeatedly mentions contingency planning for the development, and presumable use, of chemical and biological weapons. Along those same lines, the direction of nuclear war was pretty much set by 1948, as the first target of atomic bombs became the enemy's atomic bombs. Thus, in the span of three years, atomic bombs went from being a decisive weapon, to a non-factor (although it wasn't recognized yet) as all battlefield utility (e.g. counterforce) had largely been removed from their employment. This likewise dovetails into the internecine strife that often characterized the service branch turf wars of the Cold War. In particular, the Air Force/Navy battles become apparent as the Air Force argues that atomic war is the primary task in any future war, rather than one of many. In addition, although it is never explicit, the refusal to mount a first strike becomes implicit in U.S. military planning at this point. Finally, Ross' discussion of the fears for terrorism and subversion in the U.S., including the use of unconventional weapons by Soviet agents strongly echoes the fears of a post 9/11 world.
Ultimately, the need to shore up European allies in the newly formed NATO brings planning full circle, as the Joint Chiefs are forced by political requirements to plan for the defense of Europe. This, when combined with the Korean War, finally begins the process of funding that will allow the U.S. to have at least a reasonable chance of defending Europe. Thus, in five years another full circle is achieved as the military is gutted to achieve a political expedient, only to be rebuilt in order to achieve a different one.
In the end, Ross has done an excellent job of compiling numerous primary sources into a through, cogent and readable volume. His considerations of budget constraints versus planning necessities serve as a constant grounding for the work, and his exploration of the challenges of atomic planning is both interesting in and of itself, and critical to understanding the development of America strategy. This is a must read for any student of the Cold War.
Jake Mohlman


Prophetic, cold-eyed, hostile to the original cold warriorsRecall that in November 1918, the Kerensky government was unseated, and the Bolsheviks were proceeding with discussion of a "separate peace" with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. Quite upsetting the Allies...
Much of the book focuses on the conflicts between the Allies who had pledged "non-intervention" in Russian politics as a precondition to "rescuing" the 8,000 or so Czech soldiers cut off from the war against Germany and Austria. What Graves found was that the Czechs needed no rescuing, and had in fact taken the Trans-Siberian railroad and many whole towns along it, chasing off any local revolutionaries who objected. Japanese and hired Cossacks (Semeonoff and Kalmikoff), prodded by the Brits and French (who had few troops in the region)were enthusiastically murdering, raping and pillaging any and all Siberians who did not support Kolchak, the last vestige of the Czar's rule.
There was little Bolshevik military activity in Siberia when Graves arrived. He spread the US troops around to guard several hundred miles of railroad, supposedly against the Bolshies. Instead, he soon and continually found the Japanese, Brits, and then even US diplomatic types (including the Consul General) attempting to get the Americans into Bolshevik hunting parties. Many examples of Japanese-staged provocations and manipulations, including shooting of Americans, are catalogued.
Graves stuck to his orders, and refused to be drawn into the war on the Soviets. Really hacked off the Brits, who called for his replacement. The Canadians fully agreed with him, and were likewise appalled at the idiocy and duplicity of the Allied support for Admiral Kolchak. When the Americans finally left on April 1, 1920, Graves estimated that over 90% of the population fully supported the Soviets, largely due to the brutalities and corruption of Kolchak and company. Graves succinctly discusses the difficulties in justifying American participation in this "non-" intervention, particularly the (to him) obvious negative perception of the Allied activities by all Russians. "...the various Governments taking part in the intervention take very little pride in this venture. Who can blame them?"
Had the Allied diplomats and politicians listened to General Graves instead of their ill-informed and ill-intentioned fellow ideologues, the vicious and near-permanent Bolshevik hostility might not have developed. Of course, the same can be said of Ed Lansdale and the idiotic French and American war managers in Viet Nam.


A great book on a neglected topic

Excellent!